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ABSTRACT. We assess the determinants of Chinese direct investment in Africa compared with those 
of global FDI. We find that economic size and macroeconomic stability are positively correlated with 
Chinese and global FDI in Africa. Institutional variables, such as accountability and rule of law, are not 
significant in either case and the same can be said about FDI-aid complementarities. The presence of 
oil is a determinant of Chinese FDI but not of global FDI into Africa. Conversely, the openness of the 
economy is a determinant for global FDI but not of Chinese FDI, which appears to favour closed 
economies possibly due to industrial organizational concerns. While these differences accord with 
intuition, we find no evidence for the claim that Chinese FDI in Africa is related to non-economic 
governance in a specific way that differs from global practice. More refined governance indicators 
should be used to verify whether Chinese and global FDI into Africa remain indistinguishable on this 
score: we plan to do this in future research.  
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DRIVERS OF CHINA’S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO AFRICA  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Investing in China’s booming economy has been a salient world feature since the mid 
1980s. The main reason for the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) lies with China’s 
pursuit of market-orientated reforms, coupled with a large internal market and low 
production costs. The fact that China itself began to invest heavily abroad, using the 
proceeds from its growing trade surplus, from the early 1990s onwards is less recognized. 
Nevertheless, the recent surge in Chinese investment, especially in Africa, has drawn 
considerable attention from policy-makers and academics, who seek to understand whether 
it is being driven by a possible “China-Africa factor”.  
 
[Figures 1 to 4 here] 
 
The recent trends in inward and outward African and Chinese FDI are depicted in 
Figures 1 to 4. Not unexpectedly, they reveal that inward FDI is still far greater than outward 
FDI in both cases.  It is striking, however, that the 2006 stock of Chinese outward FDI (in 
millions of US$) was 13 times greater when compared to its 1991 level. Moreover, China’s 
outward flows also increased dramatically, especially from the mid 1990s onwards 
  
[Figures 5 to 7 here] 
 
As for the geographical dispersion of China’s outward FDI, Figures 5 and 6 show that 
Latin America and Asia account for the lion’s share of both stocks and flows. At first sight, 
this observation may suggest that Africa does not feature prominently in China’s 
international investment strategy. However, if we exclude these two regions, we observe 
that, in relative terms, Chinese outward FDI is increasingly targeting Africa and less so North 
America and Oceania. Africa clearly matters for China, as demonstrated by the recent 
investments in Sudanese infrastructure (Figure 7). 
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Indeed, Wang (2007)1 reports that China has either become a major market, donor, 
financier, investor or a combination of these roles for many African countries. In general, it is 
fair to say, that China’s current engagement in Africa is primarily trade and investment 
rather than aid-related and that the private sector’s role in it is increasingly more 
pronounced. As for Chinese investment in Africa, the big surge occurred in 2003 following 
the implementation of China’s strategic “going out” policy. As a result, outflows to Africa 
increased from under 100 million US$ to more than 500 million US$ during the period 2003 
to 2006.  
 In this paper, we use aggregate data on the drivers of China’s FDI into Africa and 
compare them to those of global FDI into Africa to better understand China’s engagement 
with the continent. Specifically, we consider the role of macroeconomic stability, degree of 
openness, oil as well as that of the rule of law and accountability. The inclusion of the two 
latter variables is motivated by many observers’ contention that China disregards these 
important institutions when pursing its investment strategy.  Indeed, China explicitly 
acknowledges that it is not its business to interfere in domestic concerns. As early as 1964, 
the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai defined the “Eight Principles for China’s Aid to Foreign 
Countries”. One of these, states that “in providing aid to other countries, the Chinese 
Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries”. As such, we want 
to know whether there is empirical evidence for this contention. 
Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly describe the determinants 
for FDI based on different categorizations found in the literature. Section 3 discusses our 
estimation results while section 4 concludes. 
 
2. DRIVERS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 Modern FDI theory follows Stephen Hymer2 (1934-1974)’s seminal doctoral  thesis at 
MIT, written in 1960 and published in 1976. He claimed that the main determinants of FDI 
are industrial organization, rather portfolio investment concerns. Rather than explaining 
these capital flows via interest rate differentials, Hymer emphasized market imperfections 
instead. He considered control and market share to be the principal forces driving force of 
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FDI, through which firms find it optimal to keep control of production. This control allows 
them either to suppress competition, or to appropriate rents derived from advantages like 
skilled labour, cheap raw materials, access to capital markets or technology. He 
subsequently complemented this perspective by describing the reasons behind vertical 
integration (to overcome negotiation problems due to market imperfections such as 
bilateral oligopoly, to diversify the enterprise’s assets, and to allow information to circulate 
better within the corporation) and horizontal integration (to avoid the risk of a licensee using 
the information to compete against the multinational enterprise, and because greater 
profits simply result in easier collusion). Later related work, undertaken by Williamson 
(1975)3, also put forward transaction costs as being another driving force behind FDI. 
Following Hymer’s contribution, Dunning (1993)4 identifies four determinants of FDI 
based on three possible types of competitive advantages, which are also discussed in Zhou 
and Lall (2005).5 With respect to the competitive advantages, one may broadly speak of: 
ownership-specific advantages (related to capital, either human or physical, technology, 
management, etc.); location-specific advantages (arising from economic, social or political 
advantages of investing in a specific location); and, internalisation advantages (related to the 
nature of investment, e.g. whether it is better to merge or to install productive capacity 
single-handedly). 
These, in turn, lead to four motives for investing abroad: market-seeking, (foreign 
investors are attracted by the size of the domestic market and/or its investment climate); 
resource-seeking (a country’s natural resources attract multinational corporations (MNCs), 
who also may seek out labour-abundant countries with good production facilities and 
infrastructure); asset-seeking (MNCs seek to establish strong asset positions in order to fulfil 
their long run commercial and other goals; and, lastly, efficiency-seeking (MNCs seek to 
achieve economies of scale through their expansion abroad).  
More recent literature has put forward new categorisations that complement and 
extend previous ones. For instance, Asiedu (2002)6 and Asiedu and Lien (2004)7 focus on 
natural resources, openness, political risk and infrastructure. Broadman (2007), meanwhile, 
defines three groups of factors that affect trade and foreign direct investment between 
Africa and Asia: these are ''at-the-border'' policies (such as tariffs, quotas and trade or 
investment agreements); ''behind-the-border'' conditions (such as market structures, the 
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quality of institutions, infrastructure and macroeconomic environment) and ''between-the-
border'' conditions (which relates to logistical simplification, information and/or ethnic 
networks that help disseminate the perception of opportunities abroad). 
 In the Chinese case, the emergence of large state-owned companies endowed with 
considerable reserves has allowed for significant investment in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa. One of the reasons frequently cited regarding China's interest in Africa is its desire to 
ensure a reliable supply of much-needed commodities, such as crude oil amongst others. 
This corresponds to an essentially resource-seeking motive. Indeed, Broadman (2007)8 finds, 
using UNCTAD data, that crude oil accounts for over 60 percent of African exports to China. 
Other items are found to have a much smaller weight in export make-up, e.g. the diamonds 
that China imports, almost exclusively from South Africa, accounts for around three percent 
only.  
In the next section, we seek to understand what drive’s China’s FDI in Africa. In doing 
so, we focus on ''behind-the-border'' conditions in accordance with the typologies presented 
in Asiedu (2002) and Broadman (2007). Note that, by design, our study does not address the 
so-called “Africa factor” that is referred to by Asiedu (2002). Under this viewpoint, good 
institutions, more flexible markets and a better prepared working force alone do not explain 
FDI flows into the African continent, and so geography is also considered to be an important 
FDI determinant.   
 
3. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The data have been collected from various sources. Data on Chinese FDI into Africa 
comes from the MOFCOM (2006)9 report while the World Development Indicators CD-ROM 
provides data on inflation, degree of openness, GDP, population, and global FDI and aid into 
each African country. The data on Africa’s export structure and China’s import structure 
comes from Broadman (2007). We use Brautigam (2008)10 to obtain data on the loan 
agreements between China and African countries while data on governance were drawn 
from Kaufmann et al. (2006)11 and the Heritage Foundation. Our sample is a panel data 
covering all African countries for the period 2003-2006. As such, it has a stronger cross-
section dimension than a time-series one and all corresponding asymptotic theory applies. 
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We recognise that the models used previously to study the driver’s of FDI vary 
considerably depending on the exact research question being addressed, as well as on data 
availability which is know to be a serious issue for many African countries. Moreover, the 
accuracy of Chinese data has also been disputed (see Wang, 2007). With these caveats in 
mind, we estimate the following model: 
 
titititi
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where logFDI and logGDP respectively represent the logarithms of real Foreign Direct 
Investment and Gross Domestic Product; logPop is the logarithm of population; logSurf is the 
logarithm of surface area; Openness is the degree of openness (measured by the volume of 
trade divided by GDP); Oil is a dummy variable reflecting the fact that the greatest export 
from that country is oil (oil1) or that the country is a major exporter of oil to China (oil2); 
Institutions is an institutional variable that captures rule of law or accountability; and, Aid is 
a dummy variable indicating the existence of loan agreements in place, which we use as a 
proxy for bilateral aid as described by Brautigam (2008)12.  
Although our model follows Chang and Ma (2007)13 - another useful and related 
reference is Onyeiwu and Shrestha  (2004)14 - we go beyond their analysis by including 
additional behind-the-border variables in order to better capture the drivers that might be 
pivotal in shaping China’s decision to invest in Africa. Our initial estimation procedure is as 
follows: we first estimate a pooled model for Chinese FDI alone and then for the world’s FDI 
in Africa. This procedure allows us to compare the drivers for China’s FDI with those of the 
world’s FDI. Table 1 summarises the estimation results (using the oil1 dummy) while full 
results are detailed in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
[Tables 1 to 3 here] 
 
We find that the level of GDP of the host African country is positively related for both 
Chinese and global FDI. For China, two other macroeconomic factors appear to be 
important, namely the inflation rate and the degree of openness. The first factor is probably 
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related to macroeconomic stability concerns, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, real exchange 
rate considerations. Regarding the second, it is surprising that the degree of openness 
affects negatively FDI. One could read this result as an indication that local markets matter 
to China and that it is trying to leap over the border to serve these. Or, that China could 
simply be investing in countries that are less integrated into the world economy. As for 
global FDI, it is positively related with the degree of openness, which implies that more 
integrated African countries attract larger FDI.   
The most disparate result is that oil appears to be associated with higher FDI in the 
case of China whilst having no relation to world FDI. Moreover, if we use the oil2 dummy in 
our estimations (so as to consider only those countries from which China imports its oil 
instead of those rich in oil that export to China and elsewhere), this effect becomes even 
stronger (the estimated coefficient is 1.759). This implies that China is investing in the same 
countries from where it is importing oil. As for institutions, neither the rule of law nor 
accountability is related to Chinese FDI. The same is true for global FDI, however. Finally, we 
find that there no evidence of FDI–aid complementarities either for Chinese or global FDI15.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
To ensure a more robust analysis, we also estimate a random effects model, which 
assumes the existence of an individual effect for each country that is randomly distributed in 
such a way that it is not correlated with the residuals. We conclude in favour of an 
unobserved effect through the Breusch-Pagan test, as described in Greene (1997)16. In 
general, our previous findings are confirmed (see Table 4), especially with respect to oil. We 
find that being an oil exporter to China increases Chinese FDI in that country by a factor of 
approximately two. The remainder of the results tells us a similar story as those obtained 
using the pooled regressions. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Both China’s FDI and global FDI into Africa have grown substantially in recent times. 
China’s FDI outflow increased from US$ 628 millions in the mid 1980s to US$ 50 billions in 
2008 while African inward FDI increased from US$ 2 billion to US$ 36 billion over the same 
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period. In spite of the diversity of its 53 countries, Africa is often perceived to be specific as a 
host for FDI. Similarly China’s specific economy and polity are often perceived to impinge on 
its outward FDI. 
In our paper, we use aggregate data on the drivers of China’s FDI in Africa and 
compare them to those of global FDI in Africa in search of a possible “China-Africa factor”. 
Essentially, we analyse “behind-the-border” variables and see how they affect the volume of 
FDI in Africa, undertaken either by China or by the world as a whole. We find that this factor 
comes down to different regression coefficients. The existence of oil is important for China 
but not so for global FDI. China favours macroeconomic stability, measured by low inflation, 
as does the world. The degree of openness has a negative effect for China but a positive one 
for global FDI, which suggests that Hymer’s monopolistic motive for investing may be at 
work. Accountability and rule of law is not important either for Chinese or global FDI and 
FDI-Aid complementarities are absent in both cases. We plan to use more refined 
governance indicators to verify our results’ robustness in future research, as well as more 
disaggregated data and a larger sample period.  
In answering our question: “Is China specific when it comes to investing in Africa?” 
we conclude that: yes, it is different, on the one hand, as the existence of oil and a lower 
degree of openness seem to attract Chinese FDI, possibly due to resource-seeking and  
industrial organization concerns. On the other hand, it is the same as the world when one 
considers macroeconomic stability, aid complementarity and institutions. We find no 
evidence for the claim that Chinese outward FDI brings “no strings attached”. From this 
perspective, global and Chinese FDI are indistinguishable. In the end, China is different, and 
yet the same, when it comes to the drivers of FDI in Africa. 
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FIGURES 
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        Figure 1. African inward and outward FDI (source: UNCTAD) Unit: millions of dollars at current prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 2. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (source: UNCTAD) Unit: millions of dollars at current prices. 
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         Figure 3. Inward Foreign Direct Investment into China (source: UNCTAD). Unit: millions of dollars at 
current prices. 
 
 
        Figure 4. Comparing Inward and outward FDI (source: UNCTAD) Unit: millions of dollars at current prices. 
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            Figure 5. China’s outward FDI flow per region (source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment, 2006) Unit: millions of current US $. 
 
        Figure 6. China’s outward FDI stock per region (source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment, 2006) Unit: millions of current US $. 
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        Figure 7. China’s outward FDI flow per region (source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment, 2006) Unit: millions of current US $. 
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TABLES 
 
          Table 1.  Summary of Determinants of FDI into Africa  
Effect of row on column China World 
GDP 0.431 0.843 
Openness -0.011 0.015 
Inflation -0.007 -0.007 
Oil dummy 1.759 - 
                                                       Source: Appendix Tables. The estimates are significant at the 5% level 
 
                                    Table 2. Pooled Estimation Results: Dependent variable - Chinese FDI (log) 
 using oil1 using oil2 using oil2 
 Estimate 
Robust 
Std. 
Error 
p-value Estimate 
Robust 
Std. Error 
p-value Estimate 
Robust 
Std. 
Error 
p-value 
Constant -12.66** 2.656 0.00 -10.517** 2.96 0.001 -9.397** 3.032 0.003 
LogGDP 0.444** 0.143 0.002 0.421** 0.156 0.008 0.431** 0.154 0.006 
LogSurface 0.101 0.123 0.411 0.127 0.125 0.313 0.122 0.129 0.346 
LogPop 0.105 0.159 0.511 0.006 0.161 0.97 -0.039 0.163 0.812 
Openness -0.0057 0.005 0.235 -0.009* 0.005 0.053 -0.011** 0.005 0.028 
Inflation -0.008** 0.002 0.00 -0.008** 0.002 0.00 -0.007** 0.002 0.00 
Oil 1.299** 0.407 0.002 1.605** 0.611 0.01 1.759** 0.594 0.004 
Institutions 0.025 0.315 0.936 0.066 0.349 0.85 0.0961 0.345 0.781 
Aid 0.527 0.338 0.122 0.56 0.336 0.10 0.308 0.367 0.40 
Year No No Yes 
R2 0.41 0.40 0.42 
F 16.49** 15.43** 14.52** 
N 109 109 109 
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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                              Table 3. Pooled Estimation Results: Dependent variable - World FDI (log) 
 using oil1 using oil1 
 Estimate 
Robust Std. 
Error 
p-value Estimate 
Robust 
Std. Error 
p-value 
Constant -3.407* 2.047 0.09 -3.362 2.101 0.113 
LogGDP 0.814** 0.103 0.00 0.843** 0.113 0.00 
LogSurface 0.22** 0.099 0.029 0.228** 0.095 0.018 
LogPop -0.193 0.147 0.193 -0.231 0.151 0.129 
Openness 0.015** 0.003 0.00 0.015** 0.003 0.00 
Inflation -0.008** 0.0014 0.00 -0.007** 0.002 0.00 
Oil 0.371 0.270 0.173 0.268 0.283 0.347 
Institutions -0.187 0.184 0.313 -0.26 0.195 0.185 
Aid 0.155 0.099 0.122 0.161 0.099 0.109 
Year dummies No Yes 
R2 0.67 0.68 
F 30.47** 22.21** 
N 109 109 
               * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
              Table 4. Random Effects Estimation 
 Chinese FDI (log, using oil1) Chinese FDI (log, using oil2) World FDI (log, using oil1) 
 Estimate 
Robust 
Std. 
Error 
p-value Estimate 
Robust 
Std. 
Error 
p-value Estimate 
Robust 
Std. 
Error 
p-value 
Constant -12.472** 3.045 0.00 -10.59** 3.315 0.001 -2.035 3.045 0.504 
LogGDP 0.418** 0.141 0.003 0.396** 0.155 0.011 0.712** 0.103 0.00 
LogSurface 0.121 0.145 0.404 0.146 0.148 0.323 0.244 0.163 0.135 
LogPop 0.115 0.185 0.535 0.029 0.191 0.878 -0.036 0.22 0.869 
Openness -0.005 0.005 0.309 -0.0082 0.0052 0.113 0.018** 0.004 0.00 
Inflation -0.009** 0.002 0.00 -0.009** 0.002 0.00 -0.007** 0.002 0.00 
Oil 1.205** 0.452 0.008 1.407** 0.699 0044 0.445 0.368 0.227 
Institutions -0.0104 0.38 0.978 0.0169 0.423 0.968 -0.045 0.236 0.849 
Aid 0.407 0.341 0.232 0.443 0.337 0.190 0.049 0.094 0.604 
R2 0.41 0.40 0.67 
Wald chi2 99.76** 89.21** 118.00** 
N 109 109 108 
Breusch 
Pagan test 
11.64** 11.21** 31.16** 
Hausman 
test 
6.04 (p-value=0.42) 6.92 (p-value=0.328) 7.39 (p-value=0.286) 
    
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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